Introduction
Separating semantics and pragmaties is important for tile design of natural language systems, a.s well as for linguistic purposes, because the former is inherently dependent on particular lexical items involved or the overall organization of the particular language in question, titus comprising a language-dependent part of the interprctiw~ system, whereas the latter is essentially related to a more general and presumably languageindependent reasoning processes of the human or other agents involved in dialogues.
Previous linguistic study on the semantics of Japanese functional words such as dake did not pay enough attention to carefully distinguishing the pragmatic factors involved from the (lexical) semantic contents of those words. In order to build efficient natnral language systems, however, we believe that not only do we have to account for the semantics of eacb and every lexical items under consideration, but we need to have a general account of certain pragmatic aspects of the interpretations we obtain. One typical case of this kind of pragmatic inferences manifests itself in interpretations of Japanese sentences with dake , which roughly corresponds to the English word only. We believe that the kind of analysis we propose here is a prototypical example of what is necessary for successful natural language interpretation.
Differences in Interpretation of Dake-sentences
It has been observed that there is a certain difference in meaning between the Japanese sentences shown in (1,a) and (1,b) , according to the relative positioning of the two particles, dake (only) and de (by) . ( We will call the first type of sentences de-dake-sentences and tile second type dake-de-sentences for short. We will also call them in general, dake-sentences.)
(1) a. de-dake-sentence:
*also at Matsushita Electric Industrial, Co., Ltd. lalso at Wa~eda University Soko-ni-wa zitensya de dake ik-eru. tbere-LOC-TOP bike INST only go-can ((1) can get there only by bike.)
b. dake-de-sentenee:
Soko-ni-wa zitensya dake de ik-eru. there-LOt-TOP bike only INST go-can ((I) can get there by bike alone.) According to Morita[8] , (1,a) means that "bike is the only means by which I can get there," i.e. "1 can't get there by any means other than bike?' He called this tile 'absolute restriction' meaning. On the other hand, (1,b) roughly means that "I can get there by bike alone," i.e. "the minimally necessary means which enables me to get there is by bike." This be called tlLe 'minimal restriction' meaning. In this case, we have a reading ill which "I call get there by any other means easier than bike. " We can see that there is a similar difference in available readings for the corresponding English sentences, which are shown in (2) . While (2,a) has the 'absolute restriction' meaning, (2,b) has the 'minimal restriction' meaning, in Morita's terminology. (2) a. 1 can get there only with a bike.
b. I can get there with only a bike.
It might be suggested that the difference in the meanings of these sentences are due to the relative positioning of dake and de, in the case of Japanese, and that of only and with, in the case of English, which somehow causes the difference in the semantic scopes of dake or only. But when we look at other examples like (3), in which dake interact with particles other than de, it becomes obvious that the real phenomenon is a bit more complicated.
(3) a. Sono-koto-wa haha ni (lake i-eru. that-thing-Tof mother DAT only tell-can ((1) ca,, tell it only to iny mother.) b. Sono-koto-wa haha dake ni i-eru. that-thing-Top mother only DAT tell-can ((I) can tell it to only my mother.)
In (3) meaning between the two sentences in (3) is not at all clear. This is also true of the English equivalents given above. Both sentences mean that "I can't tell it to any person other than my mother." These sentences seem to suggest that there is something common to Japanese and English, an interpretive procedure for sentences involving dake and only, which effects in some difference in meaning in the case of pairs of sentences in (1) or in (2), but does not in the case of pairs of sentences in (3) .
In this paper, we will focus on these sentences and formulate the interpretive procedure which would explain the differences in these interpretations.
Previous
Accounts for
Japanese
The difference in interpretation between de-dakesentences and dake-de-sentenees has attracted attentions of Japanese linguists. We will summarize here Morita's [8] observations and Kuno's [5] generalizations. Morita [8] was the first to observe this difference and characterized these sentences as follows. ing, but in some cases, the ordering (quantifierlike particle q-particle) have 'absolute restriction' meaning as a secondary meaning. From now on, we will call the ordering of particles (particle + dake), as in de-dake, p(article)-dake, the ordering (dake + particle), dake-p(article). And we will also call sentences with these orderings p.dakesentences and dake-p-sentenees, respectively.
One common feature of these two accounts is that they are trying to capture the difference between the two types of sentences in the semantic contents of particular orderings of particles. On that basis, Morita claims that the semantic contents of de-dake and dakede are different while relative order of dake and particles other than de does not affect the semantic contents of these sentences. Kuno, on the other hand, claims that the semantic contents of p-dake and dake-p are always different, and dake-p has one additional reading in some cases, in which it is equivalent to that ofp-dake. In what follows, we will take another careful look at the details of the so-called 'minimal restriction' meaning of dake-p-sentences and try to figure out what kind of interpretive procedure is involved in causing these differences. If we look at the original dake-de-sentenee (1,b) carefully, the intuitive interpretation we obtain is something like "bike provides a sufficient means for getting there, and any other means is not necessary." Moreover we feel that "I can get there by any other means easier (in some sense) than bike. " Thus, what Kuno and Morita called 'minimal restriction' meaning can be reformulated in terms of the following two statements in (7).
'Minimal restriction' meaning: (7) a. Anything other than X is not necessary. ('necessity' part) b. Anything "bigger" or "more costly" than X will suffice. ('scalar' part)
In the case of p-dake sentences, we see that the 'absolute restriction' meaning is a part of its semantic content. (9) is weird, whereas uttering (10,a) or (10,c) after (9) is not strange at all. 
((I) can't get (there) by car,)
This shows that the 'necessity' part of the 'minimal restriction' meaning of dake-p~sentenees is not defensible, and is an inherent part of the semantic content, whereas the 'scalar part' is defeasihle, a kind of conversational implicature. Given these observations, we propose tile following hypotheses in order to explain the differences in interpretation betwecn p-dake-sentenees and dake-p- (A) and (B) above are concerned with the semantics, while (C) and (D) are concerned with the pragmatics. In tile remainder of this paper, we will concentrate on Japanese examples, but we believe that a similar if not identical, processes are involved in the interpretation of English counterparts. (ll,a) means that "I haven't been there by any means other than bike," that is, it has the 'absolute restriction' meaning, and ill,b) clearly does not have the 'absolute restriction' meaning. Although this difference in meam ing between these two sentences is clear, ill,b) does not have the 'minimal restriction' meaning. That is, this sentence have neither the 'necessity part' nor the 'scalar part' of the 'minimal restriction' meaning.
But there are other examples in which we can get the 'necessity part' and 'scalar part' of the 'minimal restriction' meaning, as in (12). (12) Taking into account examples that involve dake along with particles other than de, we notice that things get further complicated. We have already seen in (3) that in sentences involving dake and ni, we can get neither the 'necessity' part nor the 'scalar' part of the 'minimal restriction' meaning for a dake-ni-sentence, even when we use a "possible" predicate. When we do not use a "possible" predicate, we can't get the 'minimal restriction' meaning for dake-ni-sentences either, as shown in (13).
(13) a. Kazoku ni dake siraseru.
family DAT only inform ((1) will inform (it) only to my family.)
b. Kazoku dake ni siraseru. family only DAT inform ((I) will inform (it) to only my family.)
From these observations, we have at least partial answers to the two questions we raised at the beginning of this section. As for the first question, we can say that when dake-p-sentenees involve certain predicates like 'ikeru', 'itta-koto-ga-aru', the 'absolute restriction' meaning tends to disappear. Moreover, when they involve de and "possible" predicates, they have the 'necessity' part as their semantic contents. For the second question, we would say that when dake-p-sentences involve de and "possible" predicates, they also have the 'scalar' part as their conversational implicature. When they involve de but not "possible" predicates, they neither have the 'necessity' part nor the 'scalar' part of the 'minimal restriction' meaning.
These answers suggest that each part of the 'minimal restriction' meaning is tightly related, and, the particle de and "possible" predicates both play crucial roles in this phenomenon.
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The Interpretive Procedure for Dake-sentences
5.1
De and "Possible" Context
In the previous section, we observed that de-phrases and "possible" predicates are crucial to the difference in meaning between p-dake-sentences and dake- . Ills proposal is that this kind of conditional interpretation for free adjuncts becomes available within semantics of modals. Free adjm,cts would be assingcd the same semantic type as conditional clauses, and so the conditional interpretation derives entirely from the semantic rules necessary for the interpretation of modals.
lie uses Kratzer's [3] formalization for the semantic rules for modals; the semantic contents of (23) and (24) are expressed as follows.
(25) would'(D(cb)( ^ Bill_w ..... tbat_new_outtlt')) (~ BillA'ools _ever yo no' ) (26) can'(D(ch)(" John-stands_on_a_chair')) (" John_touches_the_ceiling') Kratzer uses a possible world semantics, and a simple way to read these formulae is to understaud that D is some function which maps the conversational hackground, cb, and the antecedent proposition to some possible worlds nearest to the current world, and tbat would' and can ~ are truth-functionally relating these worlds to the worlds where the consequent proposition holds. Since our main concern here is tire interaction of the conditional irrterpretation arid dake in p-dakesentences and asks-p-sentences, we will not go into the details of her analysis. It would suffice for us to express the relevant semantic contents in the following way. Assuming that de-phrases in Japanese behave semam tically like free adjuncts in English, we can get the conditional interpretation for (14) fully from the semantics of "possible" predicates in a similar way. The semantic content would roughly be the same as (29).
Interaction of dake, de, and "Possible" Contexts
Now we have come to a place where we can resolve tire problems about the difference in meaning between p-dake-sentences and dake-p-sentences. But to do so, first we have to take a further look into the nature of dake.
Only as a ]~bcusing Operator
There has been a fair amount of work on the semantics of only. Tim basic semantic content of Japanese dake is presumably ahnost the same as English only.
Only is said to be a focusing operator[Ill. This is because the truth condition of tire sentences with only depends on so-called focus, as shown in (30 Each of these sentences can be paraphrased as the sentences below them, which succinctly show the difference in their truth conditions.
The traditional treatment for this fact is provided by formulating the semantic contents of only as a binary function which maps its focus element and scope element to something of the appropriate type. The logicM form of these sentences can be written in the following way. In these formulae, the first argument is the focas of only, and tim second argmnent is its scope. When you supply the appropriate lntensional Logic translation to this function only, the equivalent Intensional Logic expressions for them results, as shown in (32).
There are problems with this kind of naive approach. See Rooth [9] arid yon Stechow[ll] for some criticisms and possible extensions. Ilere, however, we will simply assume that dake imnmdiately follows its focus element.
llow Do They Interact in Semantics?
How much of the difference in meaning between p-dakesentences and dflke-/~sentences can we account for in the semantics? From the discussions we gave in tim last section, we can obtain the conditional interpretation as their semantic contents.
A similar paraphrase for (1) will work. tlere again, we can paraphrase the sentences into sonmthing like (33) without causing any dilference in interpretation. One possible way we can think of (33,a) is that duke takes entire de phrase as its focus and takes the whole sentence as its scope. Then its logical form can be expressed as in (34). In (34), duke takes its scope over the whole modalized conditional interpretation, restricting antecedent condition for enabling me to get there only to "using a bike." This expresses the 'absolute restriction' meaning correctly. Since there is no such condition other than using a bike which enables me to get there, /can't get there without a bike.
As for (33,b), its focus is clearly the NP ziiensya and its scope is the whole antecedent sentence. Thus we obtain (36), and its translation (37). "-'%an (I get there) This time, dake takes scope over the de-phrase, whose semantic content is roughly "using a bike", and excludes any other means of transportation. The semantic contents of the whole sentence would be something like, "if I use a bike and do not use any other means, I can get there." In other words, "it is sufficient for getting there that I use a bike and do not use any other means." This means that "it is not necessary for getting there that I use any means other than bike", which is exactly the 'necessity part' of the 'minimal restriction' meaning.
In this way, 'how' part of the first question we raised in 4.2 is solved. Although (B) is stating an assumption for duke-p-sentences in general, there is only one case where dake-l~sentences have the 'necessity' part of the 'minimal restriction' meaning, that is the case where such sentences have de-phrases and "possible" predicates. In such cases, these sentences can get conditional interpretations due to those two independent facts.
• De-phrases act like free adjuncts in English.
• Free adjuncts in "possible" context can receive conditional interpretations by the semantic nature of "possible" predicates.
Conversational Implicature of Dukesentences
The remaining question is 'how' part of the second question in 4.2. We can restate the question as follows:
* How can the 'scalar' part of the 'minimal restriction' meaning be derived conversationally?
For this question, we observed in 4.2 that the 'scalar' part can be obtained when de-phrases and "possible" predicates interact. We saw in 5.1 that when de-phrases and "possible" predicates interact, we can get conditional interpretations. These facts suggest that the conditional interpretations of duke.de-sentences are somehow related to the 'scalar' implicature. Let us consider the original duke-de-sentence, again shown here.
(1) b. Soko-ni-wa zitensya duke de ik-eru. there-Loc-TOP bike only INST ~. go-can ((I) can get there by bike alone.) To get the 'scalar' implicature, we have to have some contextually salient scale. Often, certain specific linguistic expressions, such as (some, all), (bad, good), or numerals provides such scales, and 'generalized scalar implicature' is derived [6] . But in the particular case we are considering, the 'scalar' implicature is clearly contextually dependent, i.e., the scale have to be supplied by the context. Basically, almost all utterances can have the 'scalar' implicature when they are placed in appropriate contexts. But how easily we can think of the appropriate scale varies. For (1,b) and its conditional interpretation, we can think of such scale rather easily, i.e., the scale in relative easiness of various means for getting there. For example, bike is easier than walking, car is easier than bike, and airplane is easier than car, etc. But you call think of a context where this easiness changes the direction, i.e. bike is easier than car, and car is easier than airplane, etc. So the scale itself is totally context dependent. The important point is that this scale of easiness can be set based on the conditional interpretation of (1,b). We have an inference pattern according to its conditional interpretation shown in (38). This means that the inference pattern of this kind can be made salient by the conditional interpretation of (1,b). That's why the 'scalar' part of the 'minimal restriction' meaning comes with its 'necessity' part. These parts are independently derived from its conditional interpretation. The former is obtained semantically, the latter pragmatically.
The Interpretive Procedure: The
Whole Picture
The preceding sections have given an overall picture of the procedure for the interpretations of sentences involving duke. We believe that our account is more effective and exhaustive than previous ones.
First, for p-duke-sentences, we get the 'absolute restriction' meaning in their semantics, taking the scope of duke over the whole sentence. For de-duke-sentences in particular, we get the 'absolute restriction' meaning of modalized conditional swhen they have "possible" predicates.
Second, for duke-p-sentences, we get the different semantic contents from their corresponding p-dukesentences when certain predicates are involved, due to AcrEs DE COLING-92, NANTES, 23-28 Aotrr 1992the fact that dake takes scopes over their postpositional phrases. Then for dake-de-sentences with "possible" predicates, we get the conditional interpretation and the 'necessity' part of the 'minimal restriction' meaning in their semantics, in addition, the 'scalar' implicature can be obtained based on a context-dependent scale which is set by their conditional interpretations.
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Concluding Remarks
Our nlain concern in this paper is the difference in intcrpretatlons between p-dake-sentences and dake-psentences, and its distribution with regard to particles with which dake interacts and properties of predicates involved. We started by reviewing some of the previous accounts of this phenomenon and pointed out their difficulties, summarizing our basic hypotheses which cover the semantics and thc pragmatics for these sentences. By taking a closer look at related examples, we demonstrated that both de-phrases and "possible" predicates play crucial roles for the difference in available interpretations, suggesting interaction of semantic and pragmatic processes that would explain this difference. Finally, we have presented a general picture of how our interpretive procedure works for these sentences.
While most of our observations were restricted to Japanese sentences with dake, our approach can naturally be extended to the corresponding English sentences with only. We presume that tile interpretive procedure we proposed in this paper is a universal one.
